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AN APPROACH TO INCOME TAX SIMPLIFICATION
*Fred W. Peel
Income tax simplification is a popular theme. When the present
federal income tax was only thirteen years old Congress created the
Joint Congressional Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation with
the study of income tax simplification as one of its functions.'
Through the years cries for simplification have increased in number
and intensity. In President Carter's 1976 campaign he said the com-
plexity of the tax system was a disgrace, and his administration has
said that tax revision proposals are imminent.2 The Tax Reform Act
of 1976, 3 having made its own contributions to complexity, ordered
a study of income tax simplification by the Joint Taxation Commit-
tee.4 The Wall Street Journal, attempting to dramatize the issue,
urged veto of the 1976 Act because it did not do away with the
present complex system and substitute a simple tax.5
Income tax simplification-or, conversely, income tax complex-
ity-can mean a number of different things Complexity can be
illustrated by the length of the Internal Revenue Code. The first
version of the present federal income tax consisted of twenty-seven
pages in the Tariff Act of 1913.1 The substantive income tax provi-
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock; B.S., Harvard College, 1939;
LL.B., Harvard University, 1942; Attorney, Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation,
1948-1952; private law practice, Washington, D.C., 1952-1976.
1. Revenue Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 20, § 1203(c)(4), 44 Stat. 127.
2. Remarks by Secretary of the Treasury W. Michael Blumenthal at the City Club of
Cleveland (July 20, 1977).
This article was written before any official announcement of the nature and scope of
President Carter's income tax revision proposals.
3. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the 1976 Act].
4. Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 507, 90 Stat. 1569 (1976). A staff study mandated by this
provision has been completed and is a comprehensive survey of the issues. Staff of Jt. Comm.
on Tax., 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Report, Issues in Simplification of the Income Tax Laws
(Comm. Print 1977).
5. Wall St. J., Sept. 14, 1976, at 22.
6. Blum, Simplification of the Federal Income Tax Law, 10 Tax L. Rev. 239 (1955).
7. Pub. L. No. 16, § II A, 38 Stat. 166 (1913) [hereinafter referred to as the 1913 Act].
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sions in the Code now cover over 1000 pages in the Commerce Clear-
ing House loose leaf Code volume. Another illustration is the grow-
ing use of paid tax return preparers. Individual returns signed by
tax preparers (i.e., anyone other than the taxpayer) increased from
18.2% in 1954 to 61.6% in 1974.8
This article considers some of the reasons why the system is
complex. A number of specific areas of complexity are identified.
The uncertain future of income tax simplification is discussed. Fi-
nally, an integrated set of proposals for radical simplification is
presented.
Reasons for Complexity
The primary reason the income tax is complex is that the eco-
nomic behavior of people in a highly interdependent society is com-
plex? A complicated income tax is one incident of economies of
scale, of skills practiced on the principle of comparative advantage,
and of a financial system that permits concentrations of capital.
Starting with an economy that is complex, and becoming more so,
all a policy of income tax simplification can hope for is to keep
complexity to a minimum.
It is difficult for persons not equipped by training or circum-
stances to comply with any broad-based tax that has its base mea-
sured by net income. Even a relatively simple income tax is compli-
cated to people not accustomed to keeping detailed records. Fair-
ness requires that the tax be sufficiently sophisticated to cover non-
cash income and cash receipts from other than employers. Fairness
also demands that deductions for income-related expenses be per-
mitted in arriving at adjusted gross income. In 1975, 49% of individ-
ual income tax returns reported interest income, 10% reported divi-
dends, 9% reported gain or loss on capital assets, and 8% reported
rents.'
Aside from the inevitable consequences of an interdependent
economic system, the principal cause of complexity is special or
differential treatment of certain categories of income or expense and
of certain categories of taxpayers."
8. Staff of Jt. Comm. on Tax., 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Report, Issues in Simplification
of the Income Tax Laws 29 (Comm. Print 1977).
9. See Cohen, Remarks, 26 Nat'l Tax J. 311 (1973).
10. Stat. of Income, Individuals 1975-Preliminary 30, Table 7 (1977).
11. Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability: Papers Submitted by Pan-
elists Appearing Before the Subcomm. on Tax Policy, Jt. Comm. on the Economic Report,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. 253 (Jt. Comm. Print 1955) (paper by Walter J. Blum).
[Vol. 1
INCOME TAX SIMPLIFICATION
Probably the main force behind this differentiation has been a
striving for fairness. '2 Simplification and fairness are not, however,
invariably in conflict. 3 From one point of view it can be argued that
removal of at least some of the differences in tax treatment would
promote fairness as well as simplification because it would move the
tax system toward the goal of treating all similarly situated taxpay-
ers alike. 4 On the other hand, the differences in the situations of
taxpayers may be considered so important that fairness requires
different tax treatment. In short, the discussion comes down to what
is meant by fairness, and to a discouraging degree, "fairness . . . is
in the eye of the beholder."' 5
For example, extending percentage depletion deductions to tax-
payers dredging clam and oyster shells could be defended as treating
them fairly in relation to taxpayers mining calcium carbonates from
quarries, thereby adding to complexity. Persons who consider the
whole percentage depletion system an unfair distinction, however,
might view extension to clam and oyster shells as increasing unfair-
ness as well as complexity.
On a broader scale, a progressive individual income tax undeni-
ably is more complex than a flat rate tax.'6 Progressive income tax
rates for individuals are fair, however, because, as a general rule,
persons with higher incomes can more easily bear higher tax rates.'7
(The further question of whether income tax rates should be pro-
gressive to implement a policy of greater equalization of incomes
introduces an additional element, independent of both fairness and
simplification, that is not discussed here.)
If Congress applies different tax treatment to the special situa-
tion of each group and subgroup of taxpayers and each type of
income in a quest for fairness, the Code will not be simple. If, on
the other hand, Congress should opt for simplification rather than
for differences in tax treatment on the theory that simplification is
desirable even though the consequences are arbitrary, questions of
12. Mills, Some Dimensions of Tax Reform, 23 Ark. L. Rev. 159, 165 (1969).
13. Comm. on Tax Policy, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Tax Section, A Report on Complexity
and the Income Tax, 27 Tax L. Rev. 325, 334 (1972).
14. General Tax Reform: Panel Discussions Before the Comm. on Ways and Means,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1973) (statement of Stanley S. Surrey).
15. General Tax Reform: Panel Discussons Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, 93rd
Cong., 1st Sess. 154 (1973) (statement of Norman B. Ture).
16. Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 U. Miami L. Rev. 1, 4 (1974).
17. See C. Galvin & B. Bittker, The Income Tax: How Progressive Should It Be? (1969),
and E.R.A. Seligman, Essays in Taxation 338-42 (1931 ed., 1969 reprint). But see W. Blum
& H. Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation (1953).
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whether differential treatment adds to or detracts from fairness
would be sidestepped.
Policies designed to achieve specific social or economic results
are another source of differences in tax treatment. For example, the
investment tax credit is designed to stimulate private investment
and modernization of plant and equipment.'" The new jobs tax
credit, on a smaller scale, is designed to stimulate employment-
and perhaps to offset the encouragement that the investment tax
credit gives to investment in labor-saving machinery and equip-
ment. 9 Deductions allowed for contributions to educational,
charitable, and religious organizations are designed to encourage
contributions and, thus, to assure that educational, charitable, and
religious objectives are achieved.'"
Income tax exemption for charitable, educational, religious,
and similar organizations does not appear superficially to compli-
cate the tax system. It would seem simpler not to tax an organiza-
tion than to tax it. Exempt organizations trading in the market
place on the dollar leverage from their exemption, however, caused
Congress to react with complex provisions taxing their passive in-
vestment income financed with borrowed funds and active business
income from businesses unrelated to their charitable function.2'
Some differences in tax treatment have been provided to bene-
fit specific categories of taxpayers considered deserving of special
treatment. The additional exemption for blind taxpayers is an ex-
ample.2" While not complicated at this stage, it is likely to become
complicated as other equally deserving groups awaken to the possi-
bility of pressing for the same treatment. Why not an additional
exemption for paraplegics or persons on kidney dialysis machines?
The additional exemption for the aged23 and the tax credit for
the elderly also are examples.24 Pressure on Congress to allow either
a limited deduction or a tax credit for educational expenses threat-
18. President's 1961 Tax Recommendations: Hearings Before Comm. on Ways &
Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1961) (message from President Kennedy).
19. With one econometric model, simulating the effect of a 7% investment tax credit
for 1951-1966 resulted in a rise in the unemployment rate for the first three years. Using an
alternative assumption that the credit is not passed through in lower prices, the unemploy-
ment rate was higher in every year. Coen, Efficacy of the Investment Credit for Fiscal
Purposes, Nat'l Tax Ass'n- Tax Inst. of Am. Proceedings 33-39 (1975).
20. For discussion, see Andrews, Personal Deductions In An Ideal Income Tax, 86 Harv.
L. Rev. 309 (1972).
21. S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 31-33 (1950). I.R.C. §§ 511-515.
22. I.R.C. § 151(d).
23. Id. § 151(c).
24. Id. § 37.
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ens an additional complication.2 5
Some complexities are the result of differences in tax treatment
designed to correspond with real or perceived differences in types of
income or types of losses. The prime example is the differential
treatment of capital gains and losses, which is essentially a dupli-
cate tax system woven into the basic system for the taxation of
ordinary income."
It must be conceded that not all differences in tax treatment
are complicating. Postponement of tax on employer contributions to
pension and profit-sharing plans until actual distribution is proba-
bly simpler than taxing the employees as their rights to the contri-
butions become vested. The tremendous potential for tax avoidance
through postponement of tax for highly paid employees, however,
resulted in sophisticated provisions to reduce abuse by setting over-
all ceilings and by placing limits on provisions that discriminate in
favor of the highly paid.2 With the passage of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) Congress assumed for
the Government the added burden of protecting the financial integ-
rity of the pension and profit-sharing plans, introduced a system of
mixed Labor Department-Internal Revenue Service jurisdiction,
and produced one of the most complex sets of provisions in the
Internal Revenue Code."
Some differences in tax treatment were designed to simplify.
The regulation allowing farmers to use the cash method of account-
ing instead of the accrual method is a good example. 2 This excep-
tion to the general rule made record keeping and compliance sim-
pler for farmers. In time, the potential for tax postponement by
high-bracket taxpayers implicit in this relaxation of normal accrual
accounting was developed through syndicated farming operations
that made advance payments for farm supplies. Congress countered
in the 1976 Act by introducing a set of complex restrictions on the
use of the cash method by farmers. 0 Farming corporations are now
25. A tax credit for educational expenses was contained in the Senate version of the Tax
Reform Bill of 1976 but was deleted in conference. Conf. Rep., Tax Reform Act of 1976, H.R.
Rep. No. 94-1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 537 (1976).
26. I.R.C. §§ 1201-1202, 1211-1212.
27. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3, T.D. 6203, 1956-2 C.B. 219.
28. I.R.C. §§ 401, 402, 408-415, 4971-4975, 6057-6059, 6692, 6693, 7476, 7802, and Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 3001-3004, 88 Stat.
829.
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-6(a) (1958).
30. Staff of Jt. Comm. on Tax., 94th Cong., 2d Sess., General Explanation of the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, 40-57 (1976).
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generally required to use the accrual method,3' and current deduc-
tions for feed, seed, and fertilizer by farming "syndicates" are lim-
ited to expenditures for amounts used during the year.2
Some complexities have been introduced into the tax system to
protect against tax avoidance techniques. For example, detailed
rules were provided limiting a group of closely related corporations
to a single $25,000 surtax exemption as a reaction to wholesale ex-
ploitation of the $25,000 per-corporation exemption by chain stores
and small loan companies.33
Another example of complexities introduced to defend revenues
is a provision added by the 1976 Act limiting a partner's deduction
of partnership losses to the adjusted basis of the partner's interest,
reduced by the partner's share of partnership debts for which he is
not liable.3" This provision was in reaction to the technique of de-
ducting partnership losses in excess of cash outlay by having the
partnership incur debts for which the partners were not personally
liable. 3 The correction of this avoidance technique in the 1976 Act
is particularly complex because the special basis adjustment of the
partnership interest applies only for purposes of computing current
partnership losses and not in computing gain or loss on the sale of
the partnership interest. 3' The result is a two-tier basis-"hard
basis" for current loss purposes and a combination of "hard" and
"soft" basis for other purposes.
Complexities are also created by rules to circumscribe and rules
to administer special tax benefits. An example is the provision for
exemption of gain on the sale of a residence for $35,000 or less by a
person who is at least sixty-five years old. The following statutory
rules have been provided to govern this exemption:37
1. Rules are provided for jointly owned property;
2. Rules are provided for situations in which only one spouse
has reached age sixty-five;
3. The exemption is restricted to one sale per taxpayer;
4. Since it is a once-in-a-lifetime exemption, it is made elec-
tive, with the consequent accompanying mechanics of a taxpayer
election;
31. I.R.C. § 447.
32. Id. § 464.
33. Id. §§ 1561, 1563.
34. Id. § 704(d). A similar rule was made applicable to four typical forms of tax shelters,
whether or not in partnership form. Id. § 465.
35. Report: Comm. on Finance, S. Rep. No: 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976).
36. I.R.C. § 752.
37. Id. § 121.
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5. To avoid an abrupt cut-off if the sale price of the residence
exceeds $35,000, a rule is provided for exclusion of part of the gain
based on the ratio of $35,000 to the sale price;
6. Apparently to limit the exclusion to deserving cases, the
property sold must have been the taxpayer's residence for at least
five years out of an eight year period;
7. Having set the eight year qualifying period, provision is
made for a surviving spouse to apply the decedent spouse's holding
period toward the five-out-of-eight-years test;
8. The exclusion covers the stock investment of tenant-
stockholders in cooperative housing corporations;
9. Rules are provided for treating a share of the gain as eligible
for exclusion where only part of the premises on the property sold
were used as the taxpayer's residence; and
10. Coordination is provided with the gain postponement
rules for involuntary conversions and for sales of residences by tax-
payers generally.
In some instances the tax law has been complicated by legisla-
tive compromises. This is, in part, a consequence of a bicameral
legislative body. Sharp conflicts between the House version and the
Senate version of a provision in a tax bill frequently are resolved by
a conference committee compromise that takes part of the House
provision and part of the Senate provision, thus compounding the
complexity by retaining the complicated features of each version.
For example, the House version of the Tax Reform Act of 196938
would have limited deductions for additions to bad debt reserves by
commercial banks to their own bad debt loss experience but would
have allowed the banks a ten year loss carryback. The Senate ver-
sion would have limited additions to bad debt reserves to 1.8% of
eligible loans and would not have allowed the ten year loss carry-
back. The conference committee settled on six years' additions to
reserve at 1.2% of eligible loans, then six years' additions at 0.6%,
then additions to reserves based on the banks' own bad debt loss
experience. The House provision for a ten year loss carryback was
retained."
Sometimes complexities develop during the course of passage
through one legislative body. The minimum tax that evolved in the
Senate in the course of consideration of the 1969 Act is an example.
As it originated with the Senate Finance Committee, the minimum
38. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969). [hereinafter referred to as the 1969 Act].
39. H. Rep. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 310 (1969).
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tax was a flat 5% tax on tax preference items in excess of a specified
exemption. 0 On the Senate floor the tax was changed to a 10% tax
on preference items after subtracting the taxpayer's regular tax as
well as the specified exemption." The two changes substantially
offset each other and left the revenue effect approximately the same
as before, but the tax was more complex and its effect was more
difficult for potential taxpayers to determine.
Perhaps the complexities that develop from thc reconciliation
of differing views during the legislative process can be ascribed to
our system of separation of legislative and executive powers. Under
a parliamentary system it would be possible, theoretically, for a
government backed by a parliamentary majority to introduce a
compact tax program and have it passed intact. In practice, how-
ever, political compromises also find their way into the work prod-
uct of parliamentary systems. Certainly the United Kingdom in-
come tax is not notably simple.2
A special breed of complexities results from transitional rules
that phase in or phase out tax provisions. There are grandfather
clauses that protect persons who relied on the tax law as it was
before a change was made, and both stricter and more liberal provi-
sions are sometimes put into effect a little bit at a time. For exam-
ple, the repeal of the Western Hemisphere trade corporation deduc-
tion in the 1976 Act is achieved by scaling down the tax benefit
percentage from an initial 14% to 11% in 1976, 8% in 1977, 5% in
1978, 2% in 1979, and zero thereafter."
On occasion a complicated provision is introduced in an at-
tempt to achieve certainty. An example is the provision that ties
allowance of exemption for dependents in the case of children of
divorced or separated parents to, first, the parent having custody
most of the year; second, the terms of the divorce decree or the
agreement of the parents as to who is entitled to the deduction; or,
third, the expenditure of specified minimum amounts for the child's
support." The terms of the provision are complicated, but the result
is to reduce the number of even more complicated factual disputes
as to who provided over half the child's support. 5
To some degree, Congress and its technicians are criticized for
40. S. Rep. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (1969).
41. H. Rep. No. 91-782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 301-02 (1969).
42. World Tax Series, Taxation in the United Kingdom, 4-116 (1957).
43. I.R.C. § 922(b).
44. Id. § 152(e).




writing Code provisions in complicated language. Section 341(e),
detailing a Congressionally provided escape route from unintended
consequences of the collapsible corporation rules, is frequently given
as an example of a complex Code provision." Section 341(e) illus-
trates one of the reasons for complexity; it provides a comprehensive
set of rules for a wide range of conduct by taxpayers engaged in
complicated affairs.4"
Some of the complexity is caused by tax provisions with ob-
scure meanings. These are not necessarily long Code or regulation
provisons with complicated wording. Some of the shortest and most
easily read Code provisions are the most cryptic. For example, sec-
tion 162(a) provides for deduction of "all the ordinary and necessary
expenses . . . in carrying on any trade or business . . . ." The
complexities are in the gloss of judicial and regulatory interpreta-
tion and not in the language. The operator of an illegal horsebook
is denied a deduction for the expense of bribes for protection from
police 4 -ordinary and necessary as such bribes may be-but is per-
mitted to deduct rent on the premises used for the illegal business."
A person who reads the simple words of section 162(a) has no appre-
ciation of the requirements for deductible business expenses. In
contrast, a person who struggles through section 341(e) will know
exactly what that provision does.
Qualification requirements add complexity. These are rules
that may or may not be clearly written, but they are difficult to
comply with in either case. A good example, which was prompted
by years of taxpayer abuse, is the substantiation required by section
274(d) and supporting regulations of deductions for travel and en-
tertainment expenses."
Mere passage of time makes the income tax system more com-
plex. There are accretions of complications, like barnacles on a
ship's hull, as new rules are developed to respond to new factual
situations. This feature can be overstated, however, because some
complications that seem to appear for the first time really have been
present all along; they merely have gone unrecognized, or at least
46. Comm. on Tax Policy, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Tax Section, A Report on Complexity
and the Income Tax, 27 Tax L. Rev. 325, 340 (1972).
47. Cf. General Tax Reform: Panel Discussions Before the Comm. on Ways aad Means,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (1973) (statement by Boris I. Bittker).
48. Charles E. Rank, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 1161, 22 T.C.M. (P-H) 53,331 (1953).
49. United States v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
50. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-1 to 7, T.D. 6659, 1963-2 C.B. 113. See General Tax Reform:
Panel Discussions Before the Comm. on Ways and Means, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1973)
(statement of Boris I. Bittker).
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uncodified, for a time. Thus, the potential for divergence between
a partner's basis in a partnership interest and the partner's share
of the aggregate basis of the partnership's assets existed prior to
1954. Only with the enactment of the 1954 Code did the tax law face
the problem and provide rules to deal with it;' the complexities
were not created but were only recognized and provided for in the
1954 Code.
High income tax rates put added pressure on most of the factors
that generate complexity.52 A 1% income tax rate would be unlikely
to inspire the inventive and often economically wasteful tax shelter
devices that developed during the 1960's and 1970's under the pres-
sure of marginal income tax rates ranging up to 70%.11 Similarly, it
is unlikely that Congress would be moved to correct a perceived
inequity in a 1% tax-whether it was an inequity by which some
persons escaped liability or an inequity by which some persons were
liable for tax on more than their true income. In fact, Congress
apparently has taken the position that a 15% minimum tax rate is
not high enough to justify the complexity of carrybacks and carryov-
ers of regular income tax that cannot be used to offset tax preference
items in the year of liability, because the 1976 Act eliminated the
carryover of such unused regular tax while raising the minimum tax
rate to 15%.11
Areas of Complexity
As an aid in discovering where simplification might be possible
the following major areas of complexity in the Code are identified:
-Differential tax rates on long term capital gains and restric-
tions on deduction of capital losses.
-Taxation of corporate income and its relationship to taxation
of shareholders.
-Finely graduated and varying tax rate schedules.
-Special treatment of contributions to, income earned by, and
distributions from pension and profit-sharing plans.
-Travel and entertainment expense deductions.
-Depreciation and depletion deductions.
-Business expense deductions generally.
-Deduction of losses.
51. I.R.C. §§ 743, 754.
52. See Wiegner, Tax Simplification, 26 Nat'l Tax J. 337 (1973).
53. The 1913 Act imposed on individual incomes a normal tax of 1% and a surtax at
rates ranging from 1% up to 6%. 1913 Act, supra note 7.
54. I.R.C. § 56, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 301(b), 90 Stat. 1549 (1976).
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-Deduction of contributions and exemption of the organiza-
tions eligible to receive them.
-Personal deductions.
-The investment tax credit.
-The minimum tax.
-Tax consequences of divorce and separation.
-Tax treatment of income from foreign sources.
-The organization, reorganization, and liquidation of corpora-
tions.
-Consolidated corporate tax returns.
-Income of trusts.
-Tax treatment of partnerships.
-Timing and measurement of income generally.
-Deductions and exclusions for special situations.
Some of the special provisions in the Code, such as
treatment of capital gains and losses, are so broad-
based that they are listed separately. Others affect
smaller numbers of taxpayers but are, nonetheless,
complicated. No attempt is made to provide a com-
prehensive list; the following partial list illustrates
the range and complexity of the special provisions:
a. Deduction of moving expenses;"
b. Postponement of gain on the sale of personal
residences;"
c. Permanent exclusion of all or part of the gain
on sale of one residence by a person sixty-five or
older;57
d. Exclusion of some types of prizes and
awards;,"
e. Exclusion of some scholarships and fellow-
ship grants;59
f. Exclusion of death benefits of up to $5000
paid by a decedent's employer;"°
g. Exclusion of disability payments for injuries
received by Government employees in attacks by ter-
rorists outside the United States;"'
55. I.R.C. § 217.
56. Id. § 1034.
57. Id. § 121.
58. Id. § 74.
59. Id. § 117.
60. Id. § 101(b).
61. Id. § 104(a)(5).
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h. Exclusion of employer contributions to qual-
ified group legal service plans for the benefit of em-
ployees and exclusion of the value of legal services
received under the plans; '
i. Exclusion of certain earnings of shipbuilding
contractors if placed in special costruction reserve
funds; 3 and
j. Exclusion of benefits paid by the Veterans
Administration . 4
-Special credits against tax.
In addition to the investment tax credit, the following
tax credits, some of which have broad impact on the
taxpayer population, have been added to the Code in
recent years:
a. The credit for the elderly;"5
b. The work incentive programs (or WIN)
credit;"
c. The campaign contributions credit;"
d. The earned income credit;
8
e. The dependent care credit;"
f. The new jobs credit; 0 and
g. The possessions credit."
-Procedures for litigating tax disputes.
The Future for Simplification
Given all the reasons why complexities develop, why is there
not sufficient pressure for simplification to keep down the prolifera-
tion of complications? Pressure for simplification has accompanied
the growth of complexity from the beginning." There have been
62. Id. § 120.
63. 46 U.S.C. § 1161 (1970).
64. 38 U.S.C. § 3101 (1970).
65. I.R.C. § 37.
66. Id. §§ 40, 50A, 50B.
67. Id. § 41.
68. Id. § 43. Not applicable to taxable years beginning after 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-30, §
103(b), 91 Stat. 139 (1977).
69. I.R.C. § 44A.
70. Id. §§ 44B, 51-53.
71. Id. §§ 33(b), 936.
72. See, e.g., the statement in Staff of Jt. Comm. on Tax., 94th Cong., 2d Sess., General
Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (1976), "Tax simplification is the second major
goal of the Act."
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simplification measures taken in recent years. The eventual phasing
out of multiple corporate surtax exemptions makes the law simpler,
though a complex provision was applied to implement it.13 The
deadwood provisions included in the 1976 Act deleted obsolete pro-
visions and excess verbiage throughout the Code." In the same Act
substitution of the credit for the elderly in place of the retirement
income credit was a move toward simplification." Perhaps the
change to a flat zero rate bracket in lieu of the percentage standard
deduction in the Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 19776
simplified computation for low and middle income taxpayers,"
though it lacks flexibility in responding to increasing price levels
and thus is unlikely to make it attractive for taxpayers to refrain
from itemizing personal deductions in future years. The 1977 Act
was also designed to broaden the use of tax tables (in lieu of individ-
ual computations from rate tables).s
Offsetting these simplification measures in the same period
have been new sources of complication. Notably, the 1969 Act im-
posed a new set of regulatory taxes on private foundations 9 and
enacted the minimum tax;8" ERISA in 1974 increased the complex-
ity of rules governing pension and profit-sharing plans;' the Tax
Reduction Act of 197582 enacted the general tax credit" and the
earned income credit84 and put into effect complex rules to define
persons eligible for oil and gas percentage depletion deductions;85
the 1976 Act made the Domestic International Sales Corporation
(DISC) provisions more complicated" and enacted complex mea-
sures to discourage tax shelters7 and to govern disclosure of infor-
73. I.R.C. § 1564.
74. Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 1901-1908, 1951-1952, 90 Stat. 1764 (1976).
75. I.R.C. § 37, as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 503, 90 Stat. 1559 (1976).
76. Pub. L. No. 95-30, 91 Stat. 126 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as the 1977 Act].
77. I.R.C. § 63(d), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 102, 91 Stat. 135 (1977).
78. I.R.C. § 3, as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 101(b), 91 Stat. 131 (1977).
79. I.R.C. §§ 507(c), 4941-4945, as enacted by Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 101(a), (b), 83 Stat.
492 (1969).
80. I.R.C. §§ 56-58, as enacted by Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 301, 83 Stat. 580 (1969).
81. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974).
82. Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as the 1975 Act].
83. I.R.C. § 42.
84. Id., § 43.
85. Id., § 613A.
86. Id., §§ 992-993, 995-996, as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1101, 90 Stat. 1655
(1976).
87. I.R.C. §§ 163(d), 189, 278, 464-465, 704(b), (d), 1056, 1254, as amended or enacted
by Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 201-214, 90 Stat. 1524 (1976).
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mation in individual files;88 and the 1977 Act introduced the new
jobs tax credit. s9
Every indication from past experience points to a further in-
crease in the complexity of the income tax system. Both Congress
and the public, when confronted with a choice between simplicity
and what they conceive as fairness, choose fairness.
Although they may not like its complexity, the beneficiaries of
a complex tax provision invariably will opt for the complexity in
preference to the simple alternative of losing their tax benefit. 0 No
one wants the income tax to be more complicated-even the accoun-
tants and lawyers who are accused sometimes of being the benefici-
aries of the complexity'9I-but they will settle for more complexity
to get, or keep, a benefit. For example, corporations with literally
hundreds of subsidiaries operating in separate locations preferred a
complex election to be subject to an additional tax as the price for
keeping their multiple corporate surtax benefits. This tax was im-
posed by the Revenue Act of 196492 as a compromise in lieu of out-
right repeal of multiple surtax exemptions. 3 In the 1969 Act, this
provision was phased out over five years, finally culminating in
complete repeal of the multiple surtax exemptions after 1974.11
Pressure from public opinion for simplification is generalized.
Pressure for differential treatment of a particular category of income
or of a particular bloc of taxpayers, with its attendent complexity,
is specific. Such specific pressure exerts a stronger force on Congress
and on the executive branch with respect to a narrow provision than
does generalized pressure. The general public annoyance at a com-
plex income tax law and a complex income tax return has not been
brought to bear on specific causes of complexity.
88. I.R.C. §§ 6103, 6110, as enacted by Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 1201-1202, 90 Stat. 1660
(1976).
89. I.R.C. §§ 44B, 51-53, as enacted by Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 202, 91 Stat. 141 (1977).
90. Surrey, Complexity and the Internal Revenue Code: The Problem of the Manage-
ment of Tax Detail, 34 Law and Contemp. Prob. 673, 691 (1969).
91. See the reference by Ass't Sec'y of Treas. Edwin Cohen to the "Lawyers and Ac-
countants Relief Act of 1969," Wall St. J., Apr. 13, 1970, at 16, col. 4.
92. Pub. L. No. 88-272, 78 Stat. 19 (1964).
93. Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 235, 78 Stat. 116 (1964).
94. I.R.C. § 1564.
95. Federal Tax Policy For Economic Growth and Stability: Papers Submitted by
Panelists Appearing Before the Subcomm. on Tax Policy, Jt. Comm. on the Economic Re-
port, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 260 (Jt. Comm. Print 1955) (paper by William L. Cary).
96. A study of public attitudes by the Roper Organization, Inc. indicates the public
would not support simplification. When presented with two specific alternative tax plans that
would broaden the tax base and lower tax rates while simplifying return forms and instruc-
tions, the sample interviewed rejected them in favor of the current tax system by a margin
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The prospects for gradually simplifying the income tax are
bleak. Even if public opinion for simplification could be mobilized,
the public's interest is unlikely to be sustained through years of
arcane technical disputes over step-by-step moves toward simplifi-
cation. 7
The conventional wisdom on how to achieve success with Con-
gress is to concentrate on small, attainable goals and to avoid stir-
ring up any more opposing pressure groups than is absolutely neces-
sary. The history of the federal income tax since 1913 and an analy-
sis of the reasons why the tax is complex indicate, however, that
working for small moderate goals will not result in a materially
simpler tax system." At best, it might slow the rate of increase in
complexity. In time, the public may come to abandon even the goal
of tax simplification and shift to "controlling" the rate of increase
in the complexity of the tax system.
A Program For Income Tax Simplification
If substantial simplification can be achieved-and perhaps it
cannot-the only hope appears to be through a radical revision put
through as a single revenue bill that could be a focus for the public's
generalized interest in simplification.
The purpose here is to present a set of proposals for simplifica-
tion of the federal income tax that is sufficiently radical to do most
of the job in one tax bill. Perhaps the proposals will be sufficiently
attractive, as a whole, to succeed in being enacted by overcoming
the objections of enough taxpayers who benefit, or think they bene-
fit, from the present complex system.
These proposals are consistent with the principles of a progres-
sive income tax. Although marginal rates on individuals would not
range up to 70% as they do now, the program well might achieve
higher effective rates on the economic income of high-income indi-
of two to one. I Roper Organization, Inc., The American Public and the Income Tax System
30 (1977) (commissioned by H & R Block, Inc.).
97. "Our present political process is incapable of achieving meaningful, overall tax
reform." John S. Nolan, "A New Tax Structure for the United States," Remarks delivered
in Univ. of Mich. Key Issues Lecture Series (Mar. 30, 1977). Nolan suggested a Hoover-type
commission to make detailed tax revision recommendations to Congress over a six-year pe-
riod, the recommended legislation to become effective at the end of the six-year period with
generous transition rules.
For a more optimistic view of the prospects for income tax simplification, see Cohen,
Substantive Federal Tax Reform, 50 Va. L. Rev. 628 (1964).
98. S. Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform 34 (1973): "[Tihe income tax system becomes
increasingly more complex as each revision or reform passes into tax history."
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viduals than are achieved at present."
The proposals are an integrated package. Many of them would
not be feasible unless other parts of the program were enacted.
These proposals would not make the federal income tax simple. In
this complex economy a tax could not be made simple without
sacrificing basic principles of fairness. What the proposals would do
is eliminate what are believed to be unnecessary complexities. In
some instances, however, the system would be fairer than it is
now.'"' Almost certainly taxpayers would be able to anticipate the
impact of the tax more accurately which, if the taxpayers are eco-
nomic beings, should lead to a more economic allocation of re-
sources.
PROPOSAL 1. REVISE THE INDIVIDUAL TAX RATE
SCHEDULES BY DROPPING THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF 25
OR MORE RATE BRACKETS AND SUBSTITUTING THREE
RATE BRACKETS-LOW, MEDIUM, AND HIGH. 01
As an example, the tax on married individuals filing joint re-
turns might be 20% on the first $20,000, 35% of the next $20,000,
and 50% on the excess over $40,000. The rates mentioned are only
for illustration. Actual rates could be set consistent with revenue
needs. The only constraint is that Proposals 7 through 10 require
that the tax rate on income of corporations, trusts, and some estates
be equal to the highest rate for individuals. A top rate for individu-
als of 50% would be feasible in this context. °0 In a sense, 50% as a
99. Using an expanded definition of adjusted gross income, Pechman estimated present
law effective tax rates for 1972 at 23.5% for incomes of $50,000 to $100,000, ranging up to
32.1% for incomes of $1,000,000 and over. General Tax Reform: Panel Discussion Before the
Comm. on Ways and Means, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 152 (1973) (statement of Joseph A. Pech-
man).
For discussion of flaws in the assumptions behind calculations of effective tax rates based
on "real" income, see Bittker, Effective Tax Rates: Fact or Fancy?, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 780
(1974).
100. "The tax expenditure measures are the items that have led to the greatest amount
of tax complexity, and are clearly the provisions whose elimination would have little or no
cost in decreased equity." Address by Comm'r Kurtz before Assembly of the Inter-American
Center of Tax Administrators (May 9, 1977), reprinted in 123 Cong. Rec. S. 8349 (daily ed.
May 23, 1977).
101. See Treasury Department, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 8 (1977), and Klein,
A Proposal to Simplify the Income Tax Rate Structure, 1964 Wis. L. Rev. 539.
102. Secretary of the Treasury Michael Blumenthal has said, "As for marginal rates,
no taxpayer, in my judgment, should be forced to turn over more than half of each additional
dollar he acquires through effort or investment." Remarks, Oct. 19, 1977, Treasury Depart-
ment News Release 4 (Oct. 19, 1977).
Congressman Corman's bill, The Tax Equity Act of 1977, H.R. 1040, § 301, 95th Cong.,
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top rate for individuals already has been accepted in principle by
the adoption of the 50% ceiling on the tax on personal service in-
come.' "3 A 50% maximum rate on investment income of individuals
would not be a windfall when taken together with Proposal 4 which
would tax capital gains as ordinary income.
Rates below the maximum rate and the size of the brackets
could be varied to accommodate the four rate schedules in present
law for individuals filing joint returns, heads of households, unmar-
ried individuals not eligible for the first two schedules, and married
individuals filing separate returns.
Further simplification could be achieved if Congress would be
willing to impose the tax without regard to the assignment of income
imposed by statute in the community property states. 4 This would
have the additional advantage of solving the nagging problems of
tax rate discrimination against unmarried individuals and against
married couples when both husband and wife have substantial in-
come. In other words, earned income could be taxed to the spouse
who earns it in community property states as well as in common law
states (as is already done in the case of the tax on self-employment
income)' and the spouse who owns an investment could be taxed
on the investment income. Married couples in community property
states would have some advantage over those in common law states
under such a system because of the splitting of investment income
from community property, but couples in common law states could
be permitted to redress the balance by equalizing their ownership
of investment assets by interspousal gifts. Joint returns still could
be permitted as a convenience to married taxpayers, but they would
be practical only in cases where combining the incomes would not
result in a higher marginal tax rate.
1st Sess., provides a 50% maximum tax rate for individuals. The Canadian Carter Commis-
sion recommended a top marginal tax rate on personal income of 50%. The 50% marginal rate
was recommended to be consistent with the 50% corporate tax rate, which the Commission
recommended retaining, because individuals should not be able to postpone their taxes by
retaining profits in their corporations. The Commission also proposed that resident share-
holders be given credit for corporation taxes. 1 Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation
20 (1966). Contra, S. Surrey, P. McDaniel, & J. Pechman, Eds., Federal Tax Reform for 1976
(1976).
103. I.R.C. § 1348.
104. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), holding that the Revenue Act of 1926 did not
tax all income to the spouse who earned it in a community property state, involved a question
of statutory construction. The Court did not hold that it would be unconstitutional to tax
income to the earner before it became property of the marital community. Cf. Lucas v. Earl,
281 U.S. 111, (1930).
105. I.R.C. § 1402(a)(5).
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Given the lack of precision in measuring taxable income and
the numerous exceptions in the tax law, the present sets of narrow
rate brackets give a false illusion of precision. Rates that vary by
one, two, or three percentage points from bracket to bracket do not
reflect with such precision the marginal tax rates on economic in-
come for most taxpayers. For example, even a low-income taxpayer
who owns his own home is taxed on a significantly lower marginal
rate on real income than a renter with the same salary.' 6
With only three tax brackets, most individuals would know
what their marginal tax rates would be for the year and could make
informed economic decisions accordingly. Also, if the present differ-
ential rate schedules for married persons and single persons were
retained, the wide brackets would reduce substantially the number
of instances in which marital status affects the marginal rate.
PROPOSAL 2. REPEAL THE GENERAL TAX CREDIT.
Whatever the relative merits are of a tax credit as contrasted
with taxpayer and dependent exemptions, simplification dictates
the choice of one or the other rather than the present system of both
exemptions and a small tax credit. 0 There is a general impression
among proponents of a progressive income tax that a credit against
tax is more progressive than a personal exemption applied to reduce
taxable income.' 8 As Gerard Brannon and Elliott Morss have
pointed out, however, it is not necessary to shift from exemptions
to credits to satisfy whatever rate of progressiveness is desired; the
rate schedule itself can be used to adjust for the fact that exemp-
tions are worth more to taxpayers with high marginal tax rates.' 9
PROPOSAL 3. ELIMINATE THE ZERO BRACKET AMOUNT
AND REINSTATE THE OPTIONAL STANDARD DEDUCTION
AS A PERCENTAGE OF ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME.
The zero bracket amount"0 attempts to accomplish two things.
First, it sets a floor on taxed income for low-income taxpaying units
and, second, it provides a substitute for itemizing personal deduc-
tions from adjusted gross income."' The considerations that dictate
106. See R. Goode, The Individual Income Tax 117-25 (rev. ed. 1976).
107. I.R.C. § 42.The general tax credit is scheduled to cease to apply after 1978. Pub.
L. No. 95-30, § 103, 91 Stat. 139 (1977).
108. 123 Cong. Rec. E1206 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Corman).
109. Brannon & Morss, The Tax Allowance for Dependents: Deductions Versus Credits,
26 Nat'l Tax J. 599 (1973).
110. I.R.C. § 63(d).
111. S. Rep. No. 95-66, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 48-49 (1977). A minimum lump-sum
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the size of a low-income floor on taxable income are not the same
as the considerations for an optional deduction in lieu of itemized
personal deductions. The optional standard deduction was designed
to relieve taxpayers and the Revenue Service from the complexities
of calculating, substantiating, and auditing small personal deduc-
tion items such as charitable contributions and non-business inter-
est deductions.12 If the amount of the optional standard deduction
is held down to an amount considered appropriate for outright ex-
emption of low-income earners, it will not simplify the returns of
middle-income taxpayers. Rather than dispensing with the optional
standard deduction as a percentage of adjusted gross income, it
would be advisable to increase drastically the previous ceil-
ing-perhaps to $5000."3 The standard deduction percentage could
be relatively low if Proposal 12 is accepted,
Because the zero bracket amount is a flat amount for the tax
reporting unit, it widens the area of discrimination between single
persons and married persons. Two zero bracket amounts for single
persons total $1200 more than the zero bracket amount for a joint
return, thus adding to the rate bracket discrimination against mar-
ried couples with approximately equal incomes. On the other hand,
the zero bracket amount is $1000 higher for a married couple with
only one income producer than it is for a single taxpayer, thus
adding to the rate bracket discrimination against the single person
compared to the one-income married couple. Two trends make it
advisable to deal with this problem before it gets worse. First, more
wives are working and, with less pay discrimination against them,
they are coming increasingly into situations in which their incomes
approximate the incomes of their husbands. The second trend re-
lates to social change: there is increasing willingness to forego the
formality of marriage, so a perceived tax discrimination against
married couples if each has income may have a significant effect on
the number of marriages.
PROPOSAL 4. ELIMINATE THE DIFFERENTIAL TAX
TREATMENT OF GAINS AND LOSSES ON CAPITAL ASSETS.
It is proposed that gains from sale or exchange of capital assets
deduction was suggested as early as January, 1944. Hulse, Minimum Lump-Sum Deduction
for Individuals, 22 Taxes 20 (1944).
112. Woodworth, Tax Simplification and the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 34 Law & Con-
temp. Prob. 711, 713 (1969).
113. The highest optional standard deduction for 1976, before its repeal, was $2,800 in
the case of a joint return. I.R.C. § 141(b)(1) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-30, § 101(d)(1)).
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and section 1231 assets be treated as ordinary income"4 and that
losses from sale or exchange of capital assets and section 1231 assets
be treated as ordinary losses, eligible to offset ordinary income in
full."15
Adoption of this proposal would permit sweeping simplification
measures. The present treatment of capital gains and losses has
been called "perhaps the single most complicating aspect of existing
law.""' 6 The complex alternative tax provisions would be elimi-
nated."7 Separate capital loss carryover rules would no longer be
necessary. Separate computations for section 1231 assets would be
dispensed with."8 Section 1245 and section 1250 depreciation recap-
ture rules could be eliminated because recapture of excess deprecia-
tion on recognized gains as ordinary income would be automatic.
Problems of defining capital assets would be eliminated, including
the complex statutory rules for distinguishing capital investments
both of stockbrokers and of real estate subdividers."' There would
no longer be need for treating part of capital gains as tax preference
items.2" In the area of corporation-stockholder relations, the col-
lapsible corporation provisions could be repealed. 2 The rules dis-
tinguishing business and capital losses would become unneces-
sary. 1 The taxpayer-Revenue Service conflict over tax-avoidance
efforts to transmute ordinary income into capital gains would be
eliminated.
The one essential difference between capital gains and losses
and ordinary income and losses is the control the taxpayer usually
has over realization of capital gains and losses in contrast to his
inability to postpone indefinitely ordinary income and losses. Con-
114. Full inclusion of capital gains in ordinary income has been suggested frequently,
most recently by Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon in the model comprehensive
income tax described in Treasury Department, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform 17 (1977).
For a presentation of the arguments pro and con, see Blum, A Handy Summary of the
Capital Gains Arguments, 35 Taxes 247 (1957).
115. Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, supra note 114, at 5.
116. General Tax Reform: Panel Discussions before the Comm. on Ways and Means,
93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1973) (statement by Boris I. Bittker).
"Failure to tax capital gains as ordinary income is an all-pervasive source of trouble in
the Internal Revenue Code." Id. 284 (statement of Richard A. Musgrave).
See Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 985
(1956).
117. I.R.C. § 1201.
118. Id. § 1212.
119. Id. §§ 1236, 1237.
120. Id. § 57(a)(9).
121. Id. § 341.
122. Id. §§ 165, 166.
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sequently, as long as the tax is based upon the present concept of
realization, there will be a potential for taxpayers to realize capital
losses to offset ordinary income while postponing realization of capi-
tal gains. This behavior by taxpayers led to enactment in 1932 and
1934 of restrictions on deduction of captial losses.' 3 The logic and
the concept of fairness that support taxing gains on capital assets
at the same rate as other income, however, dictates with equal force
that losses on capital assets be allowed in full when realized. The
effect on revenue of full allowance of capital losses might be reduced
by requiring realized losses in excess of gains to be applied first
against the taxpayer's unrealized, or "paper" gains on marketable
securities. To the extent the losses were offset by such unrealized
gains the taxpayer would increase the basis of the appreciated se-
curities rather than deducting the losses against current income.
PROPOSAL 5. REPEAL THE TAX CREDITS DESIGNED AS
BUSINESS INCENTIVES AND REPLACE THEM WITH
DIRECT TRANSFER PAYMENTS OUTSIDE THE TAX
SYSTEM.
Neither the investment credit, the WIN credit, nor the new jobs
credit is relevant to the measurement of taxable income or the de-
termination of tax liability. Recent proposals that the investment
credit be made "refundable"'' 4 recognize that the credit has no nec-
essary connection with the income tax. The "refundable" credit
would be remitted to an eligible investor as a direct payment in
cases where the credit exceeds current income tax liability.
The "refundable" credit is logical. There is no more reason to
reward a business for investment in depreciable property if the busi-
ness has taxable income than to reward a business that makes an
identical investment but has a net operating loss. The same princi-
ple applies equally to the other business incentive tax credits. The
policy objective of increasing employment is equally well served
regardless of whether the employer has incurred income tax liabil-
ity.
In moving from tax credits to refundable credits congressional
thinking has come almost full circle back to direct subsidies. In the
course of debate on H.R. 8444, the Energy Tax Bill of 1977,121 the
123. Wells, Legislative History of Treatment of Capital Gains Under the Federal In-
come Tax, 1913-1948, 2 Nat'l Tax J. 12, 18-22 (1949).
124. S. Surrey, P. McDaniel, & J. Pechman, Eds., Federal Tax Reform for 1976 126
(1976); and 123 Cong. Rec. S11,411 (daily ed. July 1, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
125. Passed by the House on Aug. 5, 1977.
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Senate, to comply with its own rules for appropriation authoriza-
tions, ordered the bill referred to the Appropriations Committee and
ordered the Appropriations Committee to report back immediately
with an amendment to strike out two of the refundable credits that
were in the bill as reported by the Finance Committee. The Appro-
priations Committee's proposed amendment then was defeated on
the Senate floor.
126
Incorporating the business incentive tax credits in the income
tax structure has added additional complexities for which the in-
come tax should not be blamed. Administration of these credits is
necessarily complex, and the proposal made here will not make it
any simpler. Instead, the proposal would merely shift the blame for
these complexities away from the tax system.
Converting the business incentive tax credits to direct pay-
ments, regardless of tax liability, should help put the incentives in
better perspective for judging their cost and their desirability. These
tax credits are the clearest examples of the "tax expenditure" con-
cept that conferring a special tax benefit is equivalent to spending
Government funds. 1 7 Converting them to direct payments-
administered, perhaps by the Department of Commerce instead of
by the Treasury Department-would bring them under the annual
appropriations mechanism and focus attention on their cost effec-
tiveness.'1
In the absence of specific exclusions, the business incentive
transfer payments that are proposed would be included in the gross
income of the recipients. 9 Such inclusion would reduce their effec-
tiveness as incentives, but this could be adjusted easily by increas-
ing the amounts of the payments. In the case of the investment
credit, taxpayers, as an alternative to direct inclusion in income,
could be permitted to reduce the adjusted basis of the assets ac-
quired to earn the payments. Such treatment would be analogous
to the election under section 108 to reduce basis in lieu of inclusion
of forgiveness of indebtedness income. 30 This would mean, essen-
126. 123 Cong. Rec. S18,044-52 (daily ed. Oct. 28, 1977).
127. Cf. Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 202(f)(1)(B), 88 Stat.
304.
128. For a general discussion of tax incentives compared to direct expenditures, see S.
Surrey, Pathways to Tax Reform 129-54 (1973). Professor Surrey did not recommend replac-
ing the investment tax credit with direct grants.
129. See General Tax Reform: Panel Discussions Before the Comm. on Ways and
Means, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 713 (1973) (statement of Paul R. McDaniel).
130. See Sunley, Towards a More Neutral Investment Tax Credit, 26 Nat'l Tax J. 209
(1973). Under the investment tax credit as originally enacted, the basis of eligible assets was
reduced by the tax credit. I.R.C. § 48(g)(1) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 203(a)(1)).
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tially, that the payment by the Government would be treated as a
discount on the purchase price of the asset that generates the incen-
tive reward. Such treatment would be more consistent with the
basic principles of the income tax than is the present system under
which the investment credit is a tax-free reward.
In any event, the objectives of the investment credit, to the
extent they can be achieved at all, can be achieved more fairly and
efficiently by shortening the period for recovery of the investment
through depreciation. Proposal 6 suggests a substitute for the pres-
ent system of depreciation deductions that would make shortening
of the recovery period a feasible substitute for either the investment
credit or the direct incentive payment suggested here.
PROPOSAL 6. SUBSTITUTE A SCHEDULE OF MAXIMUM
ANNUAL CAPITAL COST RECOVERY ALLOWANCES IN
LIEU OF PRESENT DEPRECIATION DEDUCTIONS.
131
The provision in the Code for depreciation deductions has been
gradually liberalized by overlaying one provision after another on a
basic structure that, in theory, still is keyed to allowing depreciation
deductions over the useful life of the asset to the taxpayer. Liberali-
zation has come successively through provisions for the double de-
clining balance and sum-of-the-years-digits methods, 13 automatic
exclusion of 10% of the cost of personal property assets from dis-
putes as to salvage value, 33 liberal class lives limited by a reserve
ratio test,34 and, finally, the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) sys-
tem for using class lives within a range of 20% of those prescribed
by regulation.
35
What is suggested here is scrapping everything except the ADR
lives and expressing these lives (or different lives if desired) in terms
of annual, maximum cost recovery allowance rates. Taxpayers
would be permitted to use in each year any cost recovery rate from
zero up to the maximum rate for each category of assets.
The rate would be applied to the entire basis of the depreciable
asset with no allowance made for salvage. The rate would be applied
each year on the declining balance of undepreciated basis. This
131. For a similar proposal, see Williams, Simplification of the Federal Tax Laws for
Corporations, 26 Nat'l Tax J. 331, 332-34 (1973).
132. I.R.C. § 167(b).
133. Id. § 167(f).
134. Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 C.B. 418.
135. I.R.C. § 167(m), authorizing and modifying the ADR system adopted by the Treas-
ury Department earlier in 1971.
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system would be quite similar to the Canadian system.'3
Increasing the maximum annual cost recovery allowance rates
would be a feasible substitute for the investment credit.' 37 As origi-
nally proposed by President Kennedy, the investment tax credit
would have been allowed primarily on incremental investment.
13
This aspect of the original proposal soon was dropped, however, and
instead, Congress enacted a smaller credit on gross investment. In
contrast, any system of depreciation, or cost recovery, that allows
recovery of the full cost of depreciable assets while they are still
useful to the business eventually evolves to the point that the re-
ward through accelerated deductions is available only for additional
investments above the original investment rate, so that the incen-
tive element will become a reward for incremental investment.'
39
Also, the present investment credit is a clumsy tool because it
has only one rate for rewarding all assets with a useful life of seven
years or more. Thus, a taxpayer investing in assets with seven year
lives is rewarded three times as often as a taxpayer with assets that
are replaced only after twenty-one years. And, because the credit is
not limited to incremental investment, the reward has to be paid
for investments that needed no incentive and would have been made
to replace old assets in any event.
PROPOSAL 7. IMPOSE A FLAT-RATE CORPORATE
INCOME TAX AT THE MAXIMUM INDIVIDUAL INCOME
TAX RATE.
This proposal assumes a substantial reduction in the maximum
individual income tax rate. As stated under Proposal 1, for purposes
of discussion it is assumed that the maximum individual rate will
be set at 50%. Using a single corporate tax rate and linking it to the
136. Couzin, Business Operations in Canada, 45-5th Tax Mngm't (BNA) A-23 (1975).
137. For discussion of the alternatives of investment tax credit or accelerated deprecia-
tion, see Brannon, A Requiem for the Investment Tax Credit, Tax Incentives 175, 189-93
(1969). Professor Brannon chose the investment credit alternative. (The requiem proved to
be premature.)
138. President's 1961 Tax Recommendations: Hearings Before Comm. on Ways and
Means, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1961) (message from President Kennedy).
139. Depreciation deductions based on lives shorter than useful lives postpone payment
of tax. For a taxpayer replacing depreciable assets continuously at a level rate the effect is
indefinite postponement (in practical effect, permanent postponement) of payment of tax on
an amount equivalent to the excess of the speeded-up depreciation deductions on the initial
investment cycle over whatever the depreciation deductions otherwise would have been for
the same period. Once this postponement has been achieved, however, any additional tax
benefit can be achieved only by increasing the dollar volume of investment in depreciable
assets. See J. Brittain, Corporate Dividend Policy 44, 45 (1966).
[Vol. 1
INCOME TAX SIMPLIFICATION
maximum individual rate would permit full integration of the cor-
porate and individual income taxes under Proposal 8.
Elimination of the corporate surtax exemption is proposed for
three reasons. First, the present provision against abuse of the sur-
tax exemption by multiple corporations with the same owners is
complex. 4 ' Second, taxing all corporate income at the full corporate
rate permits an assumption that the income has been fully taxed
and need not be taxed again at the shareholder level. This point is
developed further in Proposal 8. Third, the corporate surtax exemp-
tion is an illogical application of the ability-to-pay principle.
The size of a corporation or the amount of its income bears no
necessary relation to the ability of its shareholders to pay. If the
corporate tax rate is less than an individual shareholder's marginal
tax rate, the stockholder has been given an opportunity to split
income and save tax that is not available to other persons.
If one focuses on the taxable corporate entity and ignores the
tax status of the stockholders, there still is no basis for a progressive
corporate income tax. The income after tax either will be reinvested
or distributed to stockholders, so there is no basis for saying the
corporate tax rate is a heavier burden on a corporate taxpayer with
a small income.
Full integration and complete avoidance of double taxation of
corporate earnings would not be possible under Proposal 8 if some
corporate income is taxed at less than the highest individual
income tax rate. Elimination of double taxation (or the threat of
double taxation) should be of more long-term benefit to the
owners of a small corporation than a surtax exemption.
Large businesses have no real alternative to the corporate form
of doing business. Ordinarily they remain in existence indefinitely
with ample opportunity to reinvest retained earnings so that the
second tax imposed on dividends applies to only a part of their
earnings and profits. In contrast, small and medium size businesses
are confronted with the dilemma of choosing between the corporate
and noncorporate forms for doing business and are largely at the
mercy of future events that determine the degree of impact of the
double tax on the owners.
140. I.R.C. §§ 1561, 1563.
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PROPOSAL 8. INTEGRATE CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAXES BY EXCLUDING DIVIDENDS PAID BY
DOMESTIC CORPORATIONS FROM GROSS INCOME. 141
This proposal is based on the premise that corporations should
properly be treated as taxable entities. If a corporation generates net
income it is logical to tax that income regardless of the status of the
stockholders. A business corporation operates in the market place
as a business entity competing with other businesses, corporate and
noncorporate, and taking advantage of a corporation's continuity of
existence and facility in assembling capital and managing opera-
tions. As such, it is a logical and viable taxpayer in its own right.
Starting with the foregoing premise, if relief from double taxa-
tion is to be provided, it must be provided by relieving shareholders
from the second tax when dividends are received.
The proposed dividend exclusion would be limited to dividends
paid from corporate income earned after the effective date of the
change. Allowing the exclusion to apply to distributions of pre-
viously accumulated earnings and profits would produce an unjusti-
fiable windfall because business decisions of corporations, their
shareholders, and their former shareholders during the period the
earnings were accumulated were based on the assumption that the
dividends would be taxed. Also, it would be unfair to distribute
previously accumulated corporate earnings and profits on the as-
sumption that they had been fully taxed at the corporate level
when, in fact, they may have been only partially taxed (because of
the surtax exemption) or untaxed (because of inclusion of various
untaxed items-such as accelerated depreciation-in accumulated
earnings and profits accounts)."'
In addition to limiting the proposed exclusion to dividends paid
out of earnings and profits earned after the effective date of the
change, the present presumption in section 316(a) of the sequence
141. For a summary of an array of alternative proposals for complete or partial integra-
tion of corporate and individual taxes, see Staff of Jt. Comm. on Tax., 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Tax Policy and Capital Formation 10-17 (Comm. Print 1977).
The Canadian Carter Commission recommended full integration by taxing corporations
at a flat 50% rate, taxing individuals at progressive rates with a top marginal rate of 50%,
including dividends grossed up by corporate tax paid in resident shareholders' incomes, and
allowing resident shareholders credit for the corporate tax paid. 4 Report of the Royal Com-
mission on Taxation 7 (1966). The Carter Commission rejected the alternative of imposing
no further tax on dividends to resident shareholders, however, because the Commission
started from the premise that it was not proper in principle to tax corporations or other
organizations. Id. at 4, 45. See Van Sickle, Reform of the Federal Taxes on Personal and
Corporate Income, 34 Am. Econ. Rev. 848 (1944).
142. Staff of Jt. Comm. on Tax., supra note 141, at 11.
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in which earnings and profits are distributed would be reversed. In
other words, each dividend distribution would be presumed to be
from the earliest post-March 1, 1913 earnings remaining in the cor-
poration's accumulated earnings and profits account. Dividends
would be paid from current earnings and profits only after the post-
March 1, 1913 accumulated earnings and profits account had been
exhausted.
Reversing the sequence of distribution of earnings and profits
would accomplish several things. First, it would minimize the wind-
fall benefits to stockholders in publicly held corporations as a result
of eliminating the double tax on dividends. Second, it would reduce
greatly the initial revenue loss from integrating the two taxes.
Third, it would equate the treatment of corporations that have ac-
cumulated income in past years with the treatment of corporations
that have paid out their earnings as dividends in past years. Fourth,
it would give an advantage in the capital markets to new publicly
held corporations over established corporations with substantial
accumulated earnings and profits.
Reversing the sequence of distribution from earnings and prof-
its accounts admittedly adds a complication. Although corporations
are supposed to know what their accumulated earnings and profits
accounts contain, some do not. Not knowing the precise amount in
the accumulated earnings and profits account was not a practical
problem for many corporations as long as they did not attempt to
compute excess profit tax credits based on invested capital during
the World War I, World War II, or Korean War excess-profits tax
periods or to distribute more than current earnings and profits and
more than they were certain was contained in accumulated earnings
and profits. Under the proposal, if a corporation wanted to clear out
its accumulated earnings and profits account so that subsequent
distributions could be excluded by the shareholders, it would be
necessary to determine the precise amount in the account. For many
corporations the question would still be of no practical consequence
for many years, however, because they will feel that they cannot
afford to distribute enough to eliminate the accumulated accounts
quickly and it will take years of dividend payments in the regular
course to distribute the earnings and profits accumulated before the
effective date of the change.
The difference in treatment of distributions out of prior accu-
mulations would make it necessary for corporations to notify divi-
dend recipients as to whether or not the dividends were excludable.
Except in marginal cases, however, this would be a simpler determi-
nation than the determination that is now made by corporations
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whose distributions are paid out of capital.
Under the proposal the corporate tax would not be considered
an advance payment of shareholders' tax that had been withheld at
the corporate level. Therefore, there would be no refunds of the
corporate tax to dividend recipients who are untaxed individuals or
exempt organizations. The integration proposal is consistent with
the taxation of active business income of exempt organizations and
the taxation of feeder corporations owned by exempt organiza-
tions. 
4 3
The definition of earnings and profits earned in years after the
effective date of the change would have to be modified to match the
definition of taxable income, with four exceptions:
(a) Earnings and profits would be reduced, as at present, by
the income tax paid by the corporation.
(b) Earnings and profits would include intercorporate divi-
dends received if paid out of earnings after the effective date of the
integrated system. (Such dividends would be excluded from taxable
income of corporations just as they would be excluded from the
taxable income of individual shareholders).
(c) Intercorporate dividends that are paid out of earnings and
profits accumulated prior to the effective date of the integrated
system would be treated by the recipient corporation as though they
were earnings and profits accumulated by it before the effective
date.
(d) Tax exempt interest would not be included in current
earnings and profits, but would be added to the account for earnings
and profits accumulated before the effective date.
Corporations no longer would be allowed net operating loss car-
rybacks, capital loss carrybacks, unused foreign tax credit carry-
backs, or other carrybacks because such carrybacks could invalidate
the basis for tax-free dividends previously paid.
The prosposal would not affect the treatment of distributions
that are not out of earnings and profits. Such distributions would
continue to be applied against the basis of the stock and distribu-
tions in excess of the basis of the stock would be treated as gain to
the shareholders.'" Under Proposal 4 this gain would be taxed as
ordinary income. Gain on redemptions or on complete or partial
liquidations would be recognized as at present. Under Proposal 4
such gain would be taxed as ordinary income.
The proposed dividend exclusion would not apply to dividends
143. I.R.C. §§ 511, 502.
144. Id. § 301(c)(2), (3).
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received from foreign corporations. Although many foreign corpora-
tions paying dividends will have borne an income tax equivalent to
the United States income tax, others will have borne lesser foreign
income taxes. Since the central purpose of the proposal is simplifi-
cation, the possibility of determining whether a particular distribu-
tion of earnings and profits by a foreign corporation was out of
income taxed as heavily as if it had been fully taxed at the corporate
level in the United States has been rejected as too complex. Simi-
larly, dividends from domestic corporations that have elected the
section 936 possessions tax credit would not be eligible for exclusion.
This proposal in combination with Proposal 7 would achieve
complete integration of corporate and individual income taxes for
future operations, except for shareholders who sell or buy stock in
corporations that have earned income and have paid tax on it under
the integration system but have not yet distributed the earnings as
dividends.
This proposal in combination with Proposal 7 would eliminate
the need for the tax on unreasonable accumulations and the per-
sonal holding company tax. Taken together with Proposal 9, it
should, for the first time, provide new businesses with a rational
basis for the decision whether to operate in corporate form.
PROPOSAL 9. REPEAL SUBCHAPTER SI45 AND GIVE ALL
BUSINESS CORPORATIONS AN OPPORTUNITY TO ELECT
TO BE TREATED AS PARTNERSHIPS.'
4
Since it is proposed that corporations be taxed at the highest
rate applicable to individuals, it is appropriate that they and their
shareholders be permitted to sidestep the corporation tax entirely.
This would be permitted by an election to be treated as a partner-
ship. The election would be exercisable one time only by each corpo-
ration.
The simplest approach would be to limit the partnership treat-
ment to corporations organized after the effective date of the pro-
posed integration of the corporate and individual taxes."41 Short of
that, partnership treatment could be opened to corporations with an
earlier history of Subchapter S treatment on condition that they
145. Id. §§ 1371-1379.
146. See Pennell, Subchapter S-The Need for Legislation, 24 Tax Law. 249 (1971).
147. See Income Tax Revision: Panel Discussions Before the Comm. on Ways and
Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 923 (1959) (statement of Mortimer M. Caplin). Id. at 930
(statement of Frederick A. Nicholson).
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make an actual or constructive distribution of accumulated earn-
ings and profits.
No earnings or profits account would be maintained by a corpo-
ration during the period of its election to be taxed as a partnership.
The complexities of Subchapter S appear, in large part, to be
the result of a system that permits corporations to come in and out
of Subchapter S without changing their essential nature as corpora-
tions. Consequently, it has been necessary to maintain earnings and
profits accounts for Subchapter S corporations and to tax the share-
holders, not on items of distributive income and deductions, but on
constructive dividends out of current earnings and profits. On the
other hand, if a corporation could elect partnership status only once
during its corporate lifetime, and then only after clearing out its
earnings and profits account, it would be feasible to treat it exactly
like a partnership and to treat the stockholders as partners while the
election is in effect.
A corporation that elected partnership treatment would be free
to terminate the election at any time. The consequences of termina-
tion would be the same as a section 351 transaction in which part-
ners contribute partnership assets to a new corporation. Once the
partnership treatment had been terminated and the corporation
commenced, or resumed, life as a taxable corporation, it would not
be permitted to revert to partnership treatment.
There would appear to be no need for the complexities engen-
dered by the present Subchapter S provisions that restrict owner-
ship to ten (or fifteen) stockholders, limit ownership by trusts, and
prohibit ownership by other corporations.
The tax treatment of partnerships is not simple. Its rudiments
are generally understood, however, and the tax law would be simpli-
fied by removing the complex in-between status of Subchapter S
corporations.
The objective of this proposal is to reduce the instances of quix-
otic differences in tax consequences between proprietorships and
partnerships on the one hand, and corporations on the other.
This proposal would make unnecessary the elaborate and
roundabout procedures that groups of investors now go through to
prevent their associations from being taxed as corporations and
preserve for themselves the right to current deductions. These
procedures have become stylized and formalistic to the point that
the Tax Court has virtually invited a revision of the distinction be-
tween partnerships and associations taxable as corporations in the
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regulations under section 7701 of the Code." 8
The solution proposed here is not to force these associations
into the corporate mold, but to permit them to avail themselves of
partnership tax treatment while using the corporate form as a mat-
ter of business convenience. This approach is followed because tax
shelter deduction benefits-to the extent they should be permitted
at all-are as appropriate for small- and medium-size investors as
for large investors. The small investors must band together to fi-
nance economically feasible projects. There is no reason why the
investor who has enough funds to finance a tax shelter investment
singlehandedly, or with only a few associates who can operate to-
gether closely enough to fit the popular image of a partnership,
should be allowed the benefits of tax shelter deductions while small
investors who must form larger, more impersonal associations
should be denied these benefits. As long as a group is willing to have
the corporate form of organization ignored for tax purposes and to
pick up distributive shares of the items of income and deductions,
there would appear to be no serious policy objections.
PROPOSAL 10. TAX UNDISTRIBUTED INCOME OF
TRUSTS (AND OF ESTATES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN
DISTRIBUTED WITHIN A SPECIFIED PERIOD) AT THE
SAME RATE AS THE CORPORATE TAX RATE.
A decedent's estate may be viewed, for a time, as a quasi-
extension of the deceased individual. On that theory it is reasonable
to tax the estate as an individual. The same logic is not applicable
to a trust, and it is not applicable to an estate that continues so long
without winding up as, in effect, to be administered as a continuing
trust.
A trust is not an individual. Trustees need not be individuals
and, even if they are, the tax on the income of the trust is not
imposed on them in their capacity as individual taxpayers. A trust
is a separate legal entity, an artificial creation of the law, more akin
to a corporation than to an individual taxpayer. Taxing undistri-
buted trust income at the corporate rate, with the corporate rate
equal to the highest individual rate pursuant to Proposal 7, would
eliminate a whole area of complexities engendered by individuals
attempting to split investment income to avoid progressive rates. 4 ,
148. Phillip G. Larson, 66 T.C. 159 (1976).
149. The complexities prompted one' commentator to suggest taxing trusts on all their
income, whether accumulated or distributed, and taxing them like corporations. Sutter,
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The proposal would not change the essential principle of the
taxation of trust and estate income. These entities would continue
to occupy a status between corporations and partnerships. Like cor-
porations, they would be taxable entities, but only for income accu-
mulated. Like partnerships, they would be conduits, but only for
income currently distributed to beneficiaries.
Taxing trusts on accumulated income at the corporate tax rate
would remove the need for complex throwback rules for income
earned after the effective date of the change. 5 ' Income earned by a
trust and taxed to the trust because it is not distributed currently
would then be excluded from income by the beneficiaries when dis-
tributed in a subsequent year. It would be necessary, however, to
retain throwback rules to govern future distributions of undistri-
buted income accumulated prior to the effective date of the change.
PROPOSAL 11. REVIEW EACH OF THE TAX PREFERENCE
ITEMS IN THE BASE OF THE MINIMUM TAX, MAKE ANY
CHANGES CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE, AND REPEAL THE
MINIMUM TAX.'5'
The minimum tax,5 2 enacted in the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
adds an additional layer of complexity to the income tax. Also, it is
erratic in its application because of the fortuitous nature of the
regular income tax deduction from the tax preference items, thus
complicating the problems taxpayers have in forecasting their mar-
ginal tax rates.
5 3
The minimum tax is imposed on tax preference items. The tax
preference items are not the result of inadvertent loopholes; all were
enacted with the deliberate object of making them tax preferences.
Thus, it seems incongruous to have the minimum tax imposed by
Congress to reduce benefits Congress has provided.'54 Senator Has-
kell has called the minimum tax a confession of failure. 5 5 It is an
Selected Areas for Simplification of Income Taxation of Estates and Trusts, 98 Tr. & Est.
964, 968 (1959).
150. I.R.C. § 667.
151. See 123 Cong. Rec. S11,411 (daily ed. July 1, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy) and
Johnson, Minimum and Maximum Taxes After Two Years-A Survey and General
Evaluation, 50 Taxes 68, 84 (1972).
152. I.R.C. §§ 56-58.
153. Peel, Corporations and the 10% "Minimum" Tax, 23 Tax Exec. 588, 592-93 (1971).
154. In the Tax Reform Act of 1969 Congress enacted provisions for liberal amortization
deductions for railroad rolling stock and for pollution control facilities and simultaneously
put the resulting increases in deductions in the minimum tax base.
155. 123 Cong. Rec. S13,435 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Haskell).
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admission by Congress of dissatisfaction with the tax preferences it
has created. Ironically, the minimum tax fails to reach the most
spectacular example of untaxed income-municipal bond interest.
Proposal 4 would eliminate the reason for inclusion of one of the
major items in the minimum tax base, long-term capital gains. The
other items can be reviewed. It would be much simpler to cut back
directly on the benefits from the tax preference provisions, if Con-
gress considers that desirable, than to retain the present complex
minimum tax.
PROPOSAL 12. REPEAL DEDUCTIONS THAT ARE
DESIGNED TO RELIEVE TAXPAYERS PERSONALLY AND
ARE NOT RELATED TO THE MEASUREMENT OF
INCOME. 5 '
Several categories of deductions under the Code are not neces-
sary to determine profits, or net income. Some of these deductions
are of expenditures that are direct benefits to the taxpayers, and
their only apparent relation to the income tax is that they reflect
expenditures or losses that may have some impact on taxpaying
capacity. It is proposed that the following deductions that reflect
expenditures for the taxpayer's personal benefit be eliminated:
a. Property taxes on the taxpayer's personal residence and
vacation home.'57
These taxes are personal expenses. Denial of deduction would
still leave the homeowner with the benefit of untaxed imputed in-
come equivalent to the rental value of the property, or a personal
expense interest deduction, or some combination of the two. Treat-
ment of the imputed income or the interest deduction could not be
changed without introducing additional complications, 5 8 but repeal
of the deduction for property taxes on personal residences and vaca-
tion homes'59 would simplify the tax and also be a step toward
equating the treatment of home owners and renters.
156. One commentator has raised the possibility of repealing all itemized deductions
from adjusted gross income and providing a mandatory standard deduction. Trammell,
Personal Deductions and the Federal Income Tax-Some Suggestions for Revision, 14 Ark.
L. Rev. 26, 28 (1959).
157. The tax revenue cost of deduction of property taxes on owner-occupied homes has
been estimated at $3,690,000,000 for 1976. Surrey & Sunley, General Report, LXIa Cahiers
De Droit Fiscal International, International Fiscal Association 46 (1976).
158. Federal Tax Policy For Economic Growth and Stability: Papers submitted by
Panelists Appearing before the Subcomm. on Tax Policy, Jt. Comm. on the Economic Report,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. 359 (Jt. Comm. Print 1955) (paper by Melvin I. White).
159. I.R.C. § 164.
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b. State and local gasoline taxes (except as business expen-
ses). 
' "
The deductions taken for personal expenditures for gasoline
taxes are only approximations at best because, in a commendable
move for simplification, the Revenue Service provides an optional
formula keyed to mileage and the gasoline tax in the state of resi-
dence."6 ' Futhermore, deduction of personal expenditures for gaso-
line taxes appear to be contrary to any rational policy for coping
with energy scarcity."2
c. Medical expenses. '63
The medical expense deduction originated as an attempt to
take into consideration the effect on taxpaying capacity of
"unusual" medical expenses.'6 ' Now it has degenerated into a com-
plex set of provisions with separate limitations on deduction of ex-
penses of medicine and drugs and of hospital and doctor expenses,
subject to percentage of income limitations and dollar limitations,
and capped with a deduction of half of a maximum amount of
health insurance premium payments. The deduction system is fur-
ther complicated by provision for exclusion of proceeds from medi-
cal insurance, requiring correlation with the medical expense deduc-
tion to prevent double benefits.'
d. Personal casualty losses. "
This deduction presumably was designed to take account of
losses that would impair taxpaying capacity. The rules are complex,
the distinction between casualty loss and ordinary wear and tear is
subtle and difficult for taxpayers to understand, and the deduction
is susceptible to widespread abuse that is difficult for the Revenue
Service to police.
160. The tax revenue cost of deduction of nonbusiness state gasoline taxes has been
estimated at $575,000,000 for 1976. Surrey & Sunley, supra note 157, at 43.
161. I.R.C. § 164(b)(5); IRS, Your Federal Income Tax 185 (1977).
162. The Energy Tax Bill of 1977, in the form in which it passed the House, would
repeal deduction of state and local taxes on gasoline for nonbusiness use. H.R. 8444, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2023 (1977).
163. I.R.C. § 213. The tax revenue cost of deduction of medical expenses has been
estimated at $2,020,000,000 for 1976. Surrey & Sunley, supra note 157, at 44.
164. 88 Cong. Rec. 8469, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942) (remarks of Cong. Hinshaw on
Report of Conf. Comm. on the Rev. Act of 1942).
165. I.R.C. §§ 104(a), 105(b).
166. Id. § 165(c)(3). The tax revenue cost of deduction of casualty losses has been
estimated at $300,000,000 for 1976. Surrey & Sunley, supra note 157, at 46.
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PROPOSAL 13. REPEAL THE EXCLUSIONS FROM GROSS
INCOME THAT MAKE THE TAX SYSTEM MORE COMPLEX.
The major statutory exclusions from gross income, in all likeli-
hood, make the income tax system simpler. These are exclusions of
gifts and inheritances," 7 life insurance proceeds,' 68 interest on state
and local securities," 9 and damages received on account of personal
injuries or sickness. 70 Other exclusions add to the complexity of the
tax system, however, and it is proposed that at least the following
ones be repealed:
a. Gain on sale of residence for $35,000 or less by persons 65
or over.' 7
b. $5000 of employee's death benefits.'
c. $1000 of income received annually by a surviving spouse
from investment of insurance proceeds left with the insurer.'
d. Disability pensions paid to persons with less than $15,000
of taxable income per year."'
e. The rental value of parsonages and rental allowances paid
to ministers.'
f. Scholarship and fellowship grants.'76
PROPOSAL 14. EXCLUDE FOREIGN SOURCE PERSONAL
SERVICE INCOME OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS LIVING
ABROAD.'77
This proposal essentially would restore the earned income ex-
167. I.R.C. § 102.
168. Id. § 101(a).
169. Id. § 103.
170. Id. § 104.
171. Id. § 121. The tax revenue cost of exclusion of capital gains on home sales if over
65 has been estimated at $45,000,000 for 1976. Surrey & Sunley, supra note 157, at 44.
172. I.R.C. § 101(b).
173. Id. § 101(d)(1)(B).
174. Id. § 105(d).
175. Id. § 107.
176. Id. § 117. The tax revenue cost of exclusion of scholarship and fellowship grants
has been estimated at $210,000,000 for 1976. Surrey & Sunley, supra note 157, at 43.
See Commission to Revise the Tax Structure, Reforming the Federal Tax Structure 7
(1973) (published by Fund for Public Research).
177. For a broader exemption proposal, see Patton, United States Individual Income
Tax Policy As It Applies to Americans Resident Overseas, 1975 Duke L. J. 691. Contra, Task
Force on Foreign Source Income, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Comm. on Ways and Means, Recom-
mendations 16-17 (1977). The Task Force recommended phasing out for taxpayers generally
the present $15,000 exclusion of income earned abroad. Also, § 313 of Congressman Corman's
bill, The Tax Equity Act of 1977, H.R. 1040, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., would repeal the present
exclusion of income earned abroad.
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clusion for bona fide foreign residents that was contained in the law
prior to 1951.118 It reflects a principle applied almost universally by
other countries.' 9 It would reduce the difficult compliance burden
on the Internal Revenue Service, and it would reduce the complex-
ity of the foreign tax credit. It would still be desirable, however, to
complicate the foreign tax credit to the extent of denying credit
against United States tax for foreign income tax attributable to the
excluded income.
PROPOSAL 15. REPEAL THE EXEMPTION OF PRIVATE
FOUNDATIONS AND DENY DEDUCTIONS FOR
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THEM.
Outright repeal of the exemption for private foundations would
be much simpler than the intricate system of penalty excise taxes
enacted in the 1969 Act. Indeed, the present system appears to be
an attempt to harass the private foundations out of existence by
financial threats to their trustees and officers and by a suffocating
web of compliance detail.'
80
The definition of private foundations would need to be sharp-
ened. The objective should be to draw a line between organizations
controlled by their donors and associates and organizations under
independent, broad-based or community control. It is reasonable to
limit exemption and the benefit of deductible contributions to the
latter type of organizations because the Government is entitled to
be assured that the deductible contributions and exempt income are
put to public uses that justify favored tax treatment.
PROPOSAL 16. CONCENTRATE THE LITIGATION OF CIVIL
TAX DISPUTES IN A SINGLE COURT SYSTEM.
It is inconceivable that anyone starting from scratch would
have designed the present system for the adjudication of tax dis-
putes. Taxpayers may choose between the district court and the
Court of Claims for refund suits, with the possibility of a jury trial
in one forum but not in the other. The Tax Court is forbidden to
handle refund suits, though it can determine that a refund is due
in an appropriate case. The Tax Court's decisions are appealable to
178. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 116(a), 53 Stat. 510, (in effect prior to Pub. L. No. 183, §
321, 65 Stat. 498 (1951)).
179. Address by Robert J. Patrick, Jr., Nat'l Meeting of the Int'l Fiscal Ass'n-U.S.A.
Branch (Nov. 19, 1976).
180. Taggart, The Charitable Deduction, 26 Tax L. Rev. 63, 65 (1970).
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all the circuits, resulting in the peculiar situation that the Tax
Court decides issues differently depending on the circuit in which
appeal would lie.''
It is proposed that:
a. The federal district courts and the Court of Claims be re-
lieved of jurisdiction over tax refund cases;
b. The Tax Court be given exclusive jurisdiction of refund
cases as well as the review of proposed deficiencies;
8 2
c. The Tax Court be reorganized on a regional basis;
83
d. Regional Tax Court decisions be appealed to a National
Tax Court of Appeals (relieving the circuit courts of appeals juris-
diction) ;184 and
e. The Supreme Court provide final review on certiorari.
This proposal would not change the treatment of criminal tax
fraud cases, but the option of jury trial in civil tax cases would be
eliminated.
This proposal would put an end to forum shopping by taxpay-
ers. It is reasonable to hope that it would provide assurance that
civil tax litigation would be judged by persons expert in the tax law.
The proposal should expedite the resolution of questions of interpre-
tation that now are often delayed by conflicts of authority between
district courts and the Tax Court and between different circuits.
Conclusion
The foregoing proposals are keyed to simplifying the income tax
system to the greatest extent possible without interfering with basic
policy objectives that Congress has adopted. Many more changes
may be desirable on policy grounds. Further simplification could be
achieved by eliminating tax incentive provisions. Suggestions on
these provisions would, however, require a review of policy objec-
tives that is beyond the scope of this article.
181. Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), affd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
182. Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income, Estate, and
Gift Taxes-A Criticism and a Proposal, 38 Col. L. Rev. 1393, 1425 (1938); Traynor & Surrey,
New Roads Toward the Settlement of Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Tax Controversies, 7
Law and Contemp. Prob. 336, 347 (1940); and Comm. on Tax Policy, supra note 13, at 352-
54.
183. Traynor, supra note 182, at 1425, and Traynor & Surrey, supra note 182, at 346.
184. For similar suggestions, see Comm. on Tax Policy, supra note 13, at 354-58; Tray-
nor, supra note 182, at 1425; Traynor & Surrey, supra note 182, at 349; Griswold, The Need
for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1153 (1944); Del Cotto, The Need for a Court of
Tax Appeals, 12 Buffalo L. Rev. 5 (1962); and Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the
Flow, 59 Cornell L. Rev. 634. 644 (1974).
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It is important not to oversell the potential for simplification
of the income tax. If the proposals suggested here were enacted and
all the tax incentive provisions in the Code were repealed, the in-
come tax still would be complex.
